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In 1870, at the beginning of the fi rst modern era of globalization, 
the world’s average per capita GDP was $873 (see Table 4.1).1 Average 
income in the richest nations—the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand—was $2,419, while income in the poorest—the African 
nations—was $500, a spread of 5:1. By 1950, at the start of the second 
era of globalization, income had risen to $9,268 in the same upper-
income group, but only $890 in the African nations, and the spread had 
risen to 13:1. By 2003, the corresponding income levels were $28,039 
and $1,549, and the spread between the top and the bottom of the inter-
national distribution of income stood at 18:1.
These aggregate fi gures masked even greater disparities among 
countries. In 2006, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a country 
with a population of approximately 57 million people, had a GDP per 
capita of $649. That same year, France, with a population of 60 million, 
recorded per capita income of $28,877.2 The ratio of the income of the 
average French citizen to a citizen of the African country was over 40:1. 
The disparity in global income has become the focus of much scru-
tiny, inquiry, and debate. The questions that have arisen include: What 
are the causes of these disparities? Is inequality among nations a con-
sequence of globalization? How should the upper-income countries 
respond? 
Among those who have sought to answer these questions have been 
a number of noted philosophers, including Rawls (1999), Pogge (2002, 
2005), Risse (2005a,b,c) and Nussbaum (2006). Rawls, for example, 
in The Law of Peoples (1999), writes: “ . . . the causes of the wealth 
of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in 
the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic 
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structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the indus-
triousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their 
political virtues” (p. 108).
The “burdened societies” lack the ability to function at a level of 
economic activity which allows their citizens to secure the minimum 
levels of subsistence, shelter, health care, etc. Rawls (1999) contends 
that the “well-ordered” societies have a duty to assist these burdened 
nations. However, the duty is not a distributive one; rather, the goal of 
assistance is to help these nations manage their own affairs.
Nussbaum (2006) criticizes Rawls for his assumption that states have 
equal standing in the global economy. She writes that to “ . . . assume 
a rough equality between parties is to assume something so grossly 
false of the world as to make the resulting theory unable to address the 
world’s most urgent problems . . .” (p. 235). She states that we need to 
“ . . . acknowledge the fact that the international economic system, and 
the activities of multinational corporations, creates severe, dispropor-
tionate burdens for poorer nations, which cannot solve their problems 
by wise internal policies alone” (p. 240).
Economic analysis cannot evaluate the philosophical merits of these 
different responses, but it can shed some light on the reasons for the dis-
parity across nations in income levels and the role of globalization in 
their propagation. A better understanding of the reasons for economic 
inequality can yield insights into the reasons why some nations prosper 
over time but others do not, and what could be done about this disparity. 
Table 4.1  Per Capita GDP (1990 international dollars)
1870 1913 1950 1973 2003
Western Europe 1,960 3,457 4,578 11,417 19,912
U.S., Canada, Australia, NZ 2,419 5,233 9,268 16,179 28,039
Asia 556 696 717 1,718 4,434
Latin America 676 1,494 2,503 4,513 5,786
Eastern Europe & USSR 941 1,558 2,602 5,731 5,705
Africa 500 637 890 1,410 1,549
World 873 1,526 2,113 4,091 6,516
Spread 4.8 8.2 13.0 11.5 18.1
SOURCE: Maddison (2007).
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This chapter reviews several studies that have sought to clarify these 
issues. 
The next section of this chapter offers a survey of the different 
explanations that have been offered to explain the disparity in global 
income and the results of empirical analyses that have sought to distin-
guish among them. The third section summarizes the research on the 
development of institutions, and the fourth section addresses the issue 
of how globalization affects the poor. The last section offers some sug-
gestions for how globalization can be managed to provide more oppor-
tunities for the poorest nations.
SOURCES OF INEQUALITY
Inequality has long been a characteristic of the world economy. The 
differences in the levels of income per capita refl ect variations in the 
growth of income in different regions, and these rates have also varied 
over time (see Table 4.2). The growth of per capita GDP in Western 
Europe, for example, rose to 1.33 percent during the fi rst era of global-
ization, 1870–1913, and then fell to 0.76 percent during the time of the 
two world wars and the intervening period. But it rose fi vefold to 4.05 
percent when globalization regained its momentum after 1950, before 
falling to 1.87 percent after 1973. Growth per capita in Asia rose from 
Table 4.2  Growth Rates of Per Capita GDP (%)
1820–1870 1870–1913 1913–1950 1950–1973 1973–2003
Western Europe 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.87
U.S., Canada, 
Australia, NZ
1.41 1.81 1.56 2.45 1.85
Asia −0.09 0.52 0.08 3.87 3.21
Latin America −0.03 1.86 1.40 2.60 0.83
Eastern Europe 
& USSR
0.63 1.18 1.40 3.49 −0.02
Africa 0.35 0.57 0.91 2.02 0.32
World 0.54 1.30 0.88 2.91 1.56
SOURCE: Maddison (2007).
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0.08 percent during the wartime period to 3.87 percent from 1950 to 
1973 and 3.21 percent in the more recent era. Between 1950 and 2003, 
Asia’s share of world GDP more than doubled, from 18.6 percent to 
40.5 percent (see Table 4.3).
The sources of economic growth have become the subject of much 
theoretical and empirical analysis in recent decades.3 Economists have 
sought to look beyond the short-term fl uctuations of the business cycle 
to identify the determinants of a country’s productive capacity. Barro 
(1997), in a summary of the work that he and others have done on this 
topic, includes the initial level of per capita income, school enrollment 
rates, and changes in the terms of trade among the determinants of the 
growth of real per capita income. Theoretical studies have focused on 
the role of technological innovation in sustaining growth over time. The 
role of the fi nancial sector in fostering development has also been the 
subject of much analysis (see, for example, Levine [1997]).
More recently, economists have attempted to uncover the “deeper” 
determinants of economic growth that exercise their infl uence over long 
periods of time (see Table 4.4). The following factors have been identi-
fi ed as possibly fundamental:
• Geography (Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup 2000; Sachs 2001). 
Many of the poorest countries are located near the equator. 
Countries in the tropic regions generally possess less fertile soil, 
unstable water supplies, and a larger incidence of diseases and 
other adverse conditions which impede their development. In ad-
Table 4.3  Shares of World GDP (%)
1870 1913 1950 1973 2003
Western Europe 33.1 33.0 26.2 25.6 19.2
U.S., Canada, 
Australia, NZ
10.0 21.3 30.6 25.3 23.7
Asia 38.3 24.9 18.6 24.2 40.5
Latin America 2.5 4.4 7.8 8.7 7.7
Eastern Europe 
& USSR
12.0 13.4 13.1 12.8 5.7
Africa 4.1 2.9 3.8 3.4 3.2
SOURCE: Maddison (2007).
up10sagaidch4.indd   60 6/22/2010   2:37:21 PM
Globalization and Inequality among Nations   61
dition, those countries that are landlocked face higher transporta-
tion costs and less access to foreign goods and ideas.
• Economic openness (Frankel and Romer 1999; Sachs and War-
ner 1995). Economies that are integrated with the world econ-
omy are open to technological advances, have the opportunity 
to specialize in the production of goods, and can take advan-
tage of economies of scale. Many of the fastest-growing East 
Asian economies have used international trade to accelerate their 
growth. 
• Institutions (Knack and Keefer 1995; North 1990). These are the 
rules and practices, both formal and informal, that govern behav-
ior. The institutions that promote property rights and an effec-
tive legal system encourage innovation by their inhabitants. The 
quality of governance provides an assurance of stability.
Empirical researchers have sought to distinguish the relative impor-
tance of these factors in the determination and variation of income over 
time. This task is complicated by their interrelationships: geography, 
for example, can affect a country’s integration with the global economy 
and the evolution of its institutions. There can also be feedback between 
economic openness and the development of institutions. In order to iso-
late the effect of the different proposed determinants, economists look 
for instrumental variables that are exogenously correlated with eco-
nomic integration or institutions, but not the other possible determi-
nants of income, to test their relationships with output. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), for example, use the 
mortality rates of European settlers in their colonies to explain the vari-
Table 4.4  Sources of Low Growth Rates










Sachs and Warner (1995)




Knack and Keefer (1995)
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ation in institutions. They reason that colonies that were located in areas 
with high disease rates were more likely to be “extractive states” where 
the colonizers sought to obtain natural resources with little develop-
ment of supportive institutions. Colonies with better health conditions, 
however, were more likely to be settled by Europeans who sought to 
replicate the institutions they had left behind. These early conditions 
infl uenced the evolution of institutions after the colonies achieved inde-
pendence. Using this identifi cation strategy, Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson examine the determinants of per capita GDP in 1995 in 64 
countries, and report that institutional development had a positive and 
statistically signifi cant impact: countries with better institutions had 
higher income levels. Geography and health conditions, on the other 
hand, were not signifi cant. 
Similarly, Easterly and Levine (2003) undertake tests of the deter-
minants of per capita GDP in 72 countries using variables such as set-
tler mortality rates to explain institutional development. They report 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that institutions play a direct causal 
role in the determination of real per capita output. They also fi nd that 
geographical factors only infl uence growth indirectly through their 
impact on institutions. In a third paper, Rodrik, Subramanian, and 
Trebbi (2004) report that the quality of institutions “trumps” the other 
possible determinants of income, including openness and integration. 
While no consensus ever remains unchallenged, these studies pro-
duce consistent results. The World Bank (2005) has summarized the 
fi ndings of this body of research: “Recent econometric and case stud-
ies have shown that even when controlling for historical endogeneity, 
institutions remain ‘deep’ causal factors, while openness and geography 
operate at best through them” (p. 57).
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The econometric evidence, therefore, indicates that differences in 
institutional development account for the dispersion in global income. 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004), however, caution that their 
results have limited practical guidance for those who wish to promote 
growth through improving the quality of institutions. They claim that 
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“there is growing evidence that desirable institutional arrangements 
have a large element of context specifi city, arising from differences 
in historical trajectories, geography, political economy, or other initial 
conditions” (p. 157).
In a survey of the research done on institutional development, Shirley 
(2005) summarizes the explanations that have been advanced for under-
developed institutions, such as colonial heritages plus resources that 
could be exploited by colonizers who designed institutions to appropri-
ate these resources; a lack of political competition, which would have 
placed constraints on political powers; and beliefs and norms that were 
not hospitable to the formation of institutions (p. 617). The proximate 
historical causes of institutional development, on the other hand, are 
greater equality combined with suffi cient political competition to limit 
the ability of rulers to expropriate, combined with long periods of time 
(p. 625).
Shirley (2005) also supports Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi’s 
(2004) point that the development of institutions depends on domestic 
conditions. She cites several examples where the transfer of existing 
institutions from one country to another failed to take root, including 
the experience of Latin American countries with the U.S. constitution 
and the record of the transition economies with U.S. and European 
bankruptcy laws and commercial codes. She cites the need for what 
Levy and Spiller (1994) call a “goodness of fi t” between specifi c insti-
tutional changes and a country’s overall environment.
Outside agents, such as the intergovernmental organizations, have 
become aware of the need for good institutions for progress to be made 
in fostering growth and alleviating poverty. The World Bank undertakes 
extensive research on this topic and maintains databases on the qual-
ity of governance and institutions. The World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Report 2002, for example, was subtitled Building Institutions for 
Markets. But Shirley (2005) is pessimistic about the ability of foreign 
organizations to induce institutional improvement, since most insti-
tutional changes take place over longer time frames than the horizon 
of aid projects. Honda (2008) studies the impact of IMF programs on 
economic governance and fi nds no evidence of a signifi cant impact for 
nonconcessional lending. Only the IMF’s concessional lending to the 
poorest countries had a signifi cant impact on improving the rule of law 
and the control of corruption.
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Another cautionary note comes from the literature on the impact of 
foreign aid on governance and development. Knack (2001) reports that 
higher aid levels had a negative impact on the quality of governance. 
Easterly (2006) has written extensively about the failures of foreign-
fi nanced development projects to improve economic performance in 
the countries where they have taken place. Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
seem to have found a solution when they report evidence that aid was 
effective if the recipient countries had implemented good macroeco-
nomic and trade policies. But Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) 
fi nd that those results were not robust to the addition of new countries 
and observations to the original data set. 
However, there may be long-term links between globalization and 
governance over time. Wei (2000), for example, looks at the impact of 
what he terms “natural openness,” that is, the level of trade openness 
that a country should have based on its size, geographic location, and 
linguistic characteristics. He fi nds a negative and signifi cant linkage 
between natural openness and the prevalence of corruption, as measured 
by Business International and Transparency International corruption 
indexes. Wei attributes this linkage to decisions by more open econo-
mies to promote good governance and minimize corruption in order to 
advance their trade with other countries. He suggests that the process 
of globalization would provide similar incentives to other economies. 
Bonaglia, de Macedo, and Bussolo (2001) also examine the impact 
of openness (imports/GDP) on corruption, as measured by the Trans-
parency International and the International Country Risk Guide, and 
fi nd that countries with a higher degree of openness record lower lev-
els of corruption. They caution, however, that reducing trade barriers 
may not bring an immediate reduction in corruption, and that domestic 
policies may be more important in the short run. Similarly, Al-Marhubi 
(2004) fi nds that countries that are more open have better governance.
The IMF (2005), in an analysis of the determinants of institutional 
transitions, fi nds that trade openness is associated with a greater likeli-
hood of improved institutions. The authors attribute this to less corrup-
tion in the export sector and the reduction of the ability of domestic pro-
ducers to sustain monopolistic rents, which could be used to infl uence 
governments. They also fi nd that transitions are more likely to occur 
when they also take place in neighboring countries.
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But international trade can also have negative effects on the devel-
opment of good institutions. Pogge (2002, 2005) points out that the sale 
of natural resources can support dictatorial regimes. First, the existence 
of such resources is an incentive for civil strife, as the winner can take 
control of state-owned properties, including publicly owned resources. 
Second, the revenues received by an unrepresentative government 
allow it to remain in power, even in the face of dissent. 
Saudi Arabia, for example, received scores of 7 and 6 on the Free-
dom House 2007 ratings for political rights and civil liberties, where 
the ratings range from 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (lowest).4 The 
government’s ability to remain in power rests in part on its oil revenues, 
which it uses to distribute services to the population. The dependence 
of energy consumers in the upper-income countries on foreign oil con-
tributes to the Saudi government’s survival. 
Globalization in earlier eras may have played a role in how institu-
tions evolved in those countries that were colonies. The maps of mod-
ern Africa and other areas were drawn by their former colonial pow-
ers when they existed. These national lines often ignored domestic 
ethnic divisions and other historical factors. The resulting geographic 
divisions were not consistent with past governing structures, and as a 
result domestic governments did not have a unifi ed basis of support 
within their populations. An even more invidious cause of underdevel-
opment has been suggested by Nunn (2008), who fi nds evidence of a 
link between African poverty and slavery. He fi nds that those countries 
that were the major sources of slaves now are among the poorest, and 
suggests that the underdevelopment of political structures in the major 
slave-exporters may be a reason for this linkage. 
GLOBALIZATION AND THE POOR
Even if institutions determine the level of economic activity in the 
long run, globalization can still have an impact on the poorer nations. 
The primary channel of transmission is the impact of globalization 
upon growth, and the evidence generally confi rms that open economies 
grow faster and see a decline in the incidence of poverty (see Dollar and 
Kraay 2004). The World Bank (2005) fi nds that growth was responsible 
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for almost all the signifi cant reductions in poverty in the 1990s, includ-
ing those that occurred in China and India. 
However, the implications of this fi nding are the subject of much 
debate and controversy. In the 1980s, many policymakers and analysts 
believed that removing barriers to international trade and capital fl ows, 
as well as lifting regulations on interest rates and other market-oriented 
measures, would lead to faster growth. Many of these recommended 
policy measures were summarized by Williamson (1990) as the “Wash-
ington Consensus.”5 The experience of the East Asian economies that 
had grown so rapidly was cited as proof that integration with the global 
economy would raise growth in developing countries. 
But the record of the 1990s raised questions about the results of 
removing fi nancial barriers. The fi nancial crises that occurred, for 
example, in Mexico in 1994–1995, East Asia in 1997–1998, and Argen-
tina in 2001 severely depressed the standard of living in those countries. 
Baldacci, de Mello, and Inchauste (2002) have reported that such fi nan-
cial crises are linked to an increase in poverty and income inequality. 
These crises showed that short-term capital outfl ows could seri-
ously disrupt the economies of countries such as Thailand and Indone-
sia, which had removed controls on capital fl ows. On the other hand, 
China and India, both of which maintained capital controls, were rela-
tively unscathed by the crisis. Malaysia imposed capital controls during 
the crisis in 1998 to slow the fl ight of capital. While there were con-
cerns at the time that the country had cut itself off from future interna-
tional investments, its economy revived and international capital fl ows 
resumed.
Subsequently, there was a reaction to what was called the “market 
fundamentalism” of the earlier period, particularly with respect to capital 
fl ows. The recent U.S. subprime mortgage crisis shows that even fi nan-
cial institutions in developed countries engage in risky transactions that 
can become full-blown crises. The IMF, which had previously encour-
aged its members to dismantle capital controls, revised its approach 
(see Joyce and Noy [2008]). The Fund now emphasizes the sequencing 
of reforms before fi nancial globalization in order to minimize fi nancial 
sector instability. The reform measures include “ . . . the development 
of fi nancial markets and institutions; prudential regulation and supervi-
sion; risk management and good practices in accounting, auditing, and 
disclosure; and fi nancial safety nets” (IMF 2002, p. 3). 
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The impact of trade liberalization on the poorest nations is usually 
seen as more favorable, particularly for those that export agricultural 
goods. However, deregulation can affect some groups within a country, 
such as those who might pay higher food prices. Winters, McCulloch, 
and McKay (2004) review the evidence for all the linkages between 
trade liberalization and poverty, and present a carefully worded ap-
praisal: “Theory provides a strong presumption that trade liberalization 
will be poverty-alleviating in the long-run and on average. The empiri-
cal evidence broadly supports this view, and, in particular, lends no sup-
port to the position that trade liberalization generally has an adverse 
impact. Equally, however, it does not assert that trade policy is always 
among the most important determinants of poverty reduction or that 
the static and micro-economic effects of liberalization will always be 
benefi cial for the poor” (p. 107).
The impact of globalization on poverty and inequality, therefore, is 
far from settled, either among economists or the wider public. Aisbett 
(2007), who studies criticisms made of globalization, points out that 
“ . . . much work remains to show which policies can reduce the adjust-
ment costs borne by the poor and maximize the share of the benefi ts they 
obtain from globalization” (p. 67). Bardhan (2006), who examines the 
linkages between poverty and globalization, concludes, “ . . . globaliza-
tion is not the main cause of developing countries’ problems, contrary 
to the claim of critics of globalization—just as globalization is often not 
the main solution to these problems, contrary to the claim of overenthu-
siastic free traders” (p. 90).
MANAGING GLOBALIZATION
Can globalization be managed to play a positive role in ending pov-
erty? Rodrik (2007) agrees with those who believe that growth is the 
most powerful mechanism to reduce poverty and that globalization pro-
vides opportunities for increasing growth rates. However, he also has 
pointed out that there are many different ways to achieve growth, and 
governments need to choose the policies and institutions appropriate 
for their nations to take advantage of the opportunities of globalization. 
His calls for pragmatism and experimentation are similar to the views 
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of Easterly (2006), who criticizes outside attempts to impose solutions 
on countries. 
Are there steps the upper-income countries could take that would 
help the poor countries? Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian (2005) 
warn that some of the proposed measures, such as liberalizing trade, 
may not have the impact that their advocates envision. Many of the 
poorest countries, for example, are importers of agricultural products, 
and removing the subsidies paid to the agricultural sector within the 
United States and the European Union would only raise prices on those 
products at a time when world food prices are already rapidly rising 
(Economist 2008). 
On the other hand, Birdsall, Rodrik, and Subramanian (2005) also 
point to concrete steps that would make the international economy more 
rewarding for poor countries. First, they claim that the upper-income 
nations can promote good institutions by monitoring and restricting the 
payments of bribes to offi cials in developing nations. Second, they pro-
pose that the governments of the wealthy countries promote research 
on issues and problems most relevant to the global poor but which their 
own governments cannot afford. One way to accomplish this would 
be to guarantee the purchase from private companies of technological 
innovations that benefi t the poor. Finally, the current regulations that 
govern international migration should be overhauled. The governments 
of countries that attract migrants can collaborate with the governments 
of their home countries to devise contract labor schemes that allow 
workers to enter the host country for some period of time, benefi tting 
both countries.
Globalization will continue, with benefi ts for countries that may 
not have participated in the global economy to date. The World Bank 
(2007) estimates that the share of developing countries in global output 
will increase from about one-fi fth to one-third by 2030. Similarly, it 
forecasts that the global trade of goods and services will rise by three 
times to approximately $27 trillion in 2030, and half of that increase 
will come from developing nations.
However, the World Bank (2007) warns that the benefi ts of 
increased economic integration are likely to be uneven across different 
areas. In addition, the prevalence of inequality within nations may rise. 
“[S]trong forces in the global economy may tend to increase inequality 
in many national economies. Even though a large segment of the devel-
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oping world is likely to enter what can be called the ‘global middle 
class,’ some social groups may be left behind or even marginalized in 
the growth process” (p. xvi).
Managing the process of globalization to benefi t the maximum 
number of people and diminish the gap in incomes across nations, 
therefore, is a challenge for all nations. This challenge has been exacer-
bated by the downturn in world trade and capital fl ows during the global 
fi nancial crisis. How governments and intergovernmental organizations 
respond will determine whether that gap diminishes or grows larger 
over time.
Notes
 1.  These fi gures are taken from Maddison (2007) and are calculated in 1990 interna-
tional dollars. 
 2. These data are obtained from the World Development Indicators and are calcu-
lated in constant 2000 dollars.
 3. Weil (2008) provides a comprehensive review of this subject.
 4. See http://www.freedomhouse.org.
 5. However, Williamson (1990) does not include the removal of controls on all capi-
tal infl ows.
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